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FINDING LGBTS A SUSPECT CLASS:
ASSESSING THE POLITICAL POWER OF LGBTS AS A BASIS FOR THE
COURT’S APPLICATION OF HEIGHTENED SCRUTINY
COURTNEY A. POWERS*
ABSTRACT
In this Article I argue the U.S. Supreme Court should find lesbian, gay, bisexual,
and transgender persons (“LGBTs”) to be a politically powerless minority group and
apply heightened scrutiny to statutes treating LGBTs differently as a result. This
argument buttresses the already strong reasoning by which the Court should find
LGBTs a suspect class and could perhaps serve as the tipping point in the Court’s equal
protection analysis.
LGBTs are a politically powerless minority group because they are grossly
underrepresented in our nation’s legislative bodies. As a result, the ability of these
institutions to respect and consider the needs of LGBTs is compromised. Direct and
proportional representation of LGBTs is necessary to ensure the interests of LGBTs are
taken into account. LGBT legislators are more likely than non-LGBT legislators to
understand the needs of the LGBT community, champion those needs, identify the
impact of facially neutral legislation on LGBTs, and serve as allies for each other in
efforts to pass legislation addressing the needs of LGBTs. Because the number of LGBTs
currently serving in our nation’s legislative bodies is far short of proportional,
Americans have reason to doubt the constitutionality of statutes enacted by these bodies
that treat LGBTs differently. Applying heightened review to statutes treating LGBTs
differently is necessary to remedy this flaw in our nation’s lawmaking process and
ensure equal protection.
I.

INTRODUCTION

In recent years our nation has begun to engage in a legal, political, social,
and moral debate concerning the liberties of lesbian, gay, bisexual, and
transgender persons (“LGBTs”), including the right to marry and adopt
children. It is likely that the United States Supreme Court will weigh in on one
or more of these issues in the coming years, particularly given the current
constitutional challenge to California’s Proposition 8—the voter-approved
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constitutional amendment banning same-sex marriage—pending in federal
court.1
In this Article I argue the Court should find LGBTs a suspect class, and
apply heightened scrutiny to statutes treating LGBTs differently, on the basis
that LGBTs are a politically powerless minority group. Such review by the
Court would make it difficult for discriminatory laws like those limiting
marriage to unions between a man and a woman to survive constitutional
muster.2 Although the Supreme Courts in California,3 Connecticut,4 and Iowa5
have recently employed heightened scrutiny in striking laws limiting marriage
to opposite-sex couples, the U.S. Supreme Court has never done so.
This Article argues LGBTs are a politically powerless minority because they
are grossly underrepresented in our nation’s legislative bodies. As a result, the
ability of these institutions to respect and consider the needs of LGBTs is
compromised. Americans have reason to doubt the constitutionality of statutes
enacted by these bodies that treat LGBTs differently. Close scrutiny by the
courts is necessary to remedy this flaw in the legislative process and to ensure
such statutes afford equal protection under the law. This argument buttresses
the already strong reasoning by which the Court could find LGBTs a suspect
class and could perhaps serve as the tipping point in the Court’s analysis.
II. EQUAL PROTECTION ANALYSIS
14th

The
amendment to the U.S. Constitution states that no state shall “deny
to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”6 This
equal protection clause requires that similarly situated people be treated
similarly.7 A statute which treats similarly situated people differently is subject
to challenge under the equal protection clause.8
Lawmakers have the initial discretion to ensure the laws they pass afford
equal protection.9 Hence, statutes which draw classifications between groups of
people withstand constitutional muster if there is a legitimate justification for
the classification, and the classification is rationally or fairly related to that
goal.10
However, statutes that draw distinctions based on “suspect”
1. See Perry v. Schwarzenegger, No. 09-CV-2292 (N.D. Cal. filed May 22, 2009) (challenging the
constitutionality of Proposition 8, a voter-approved amendment to the California Constitution
recognizing marriage as a union between only a man and a woman).
2. See In re Marriage Cases, 43 Cal. 4th 757, 840-41, 857 (2008) (holding sexual orientation a
suspect classification under California’s equal protection clause and finding California’s limitation
on marriage to only opposite-sex couples unconstitutional as a result).
3. Id.
4. See Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 481 (Conn. 2008) (holding a statutory
ban on same-sex marriage unconstitutional on equal protection grounds).
5. See Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W. 2d 862 (Iowa 2009) (holding a state statute defining marriage
as between only a man and a woman in violation of the equal protection provision of the Iowa
Constitution).
6. U.S.CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
7. See, e.g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 (1982) (striking a state law denying free public
education to undocumented children on equal protection grounds).
8. See Kerrigan, 957 A.2d at 421-22.
9. See Plyler, 457 U.S. at 216.
10. Id.
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classifications, such as race or sex, are subject to a “more searching judicial
inquiry” or heightened level of judicial review under equal protection analysis.11
This is because suspect classifications “are so seldom relevant to the
achievement of any legitimate state interest that laws grounded in such
considerations are deemed to reflect prejudice and antipathy.”12
As a result, statutes that treat suspect classes differently must be “precisely
tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest.”13 For example, there
must be an “exceedingly persuasive justification” for laws that distinguish based
on sex, and that distinction must substantially relate to the achievement of the
justification.14
III. APPLICATION OF EQUAL PROTECTION ANALYSIS TO LAWS DISTINGUISHING
BASED ON SEXUAL ORIENTATION
To date, the U.S. Supreme Court has applied heightened scrutiny to laws
that discriminate based on several “suspect” classifications: race, alienage, and
national origin.15 It has also applied such scrutiny to “quasi-suspect”16 classes
including sex and illegitimacy.17 But neither the Supreme Court, nor the
majority of state courts, have considered sexual orientation a suspect
classification or applied heightened scrutiny to statutes distinguishing on that
basis.18
The Court’s decision in Lawrence v. Texas,19 overruling Bowers v. Hardwick20
and finding a Texas sodomy statute unconstitutional on the basis that it violated
the liberty and privacy interests protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, could
signal the Court’s readiness to apply heightened scrutiny to statutes
distinguishing based on sexual orientation. In the past, several courts relied on
Bowers, where the Court upheld a statute criminalizing sodomy, in concluding

11. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938).
12. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985) (upholding a zoning
ordinance under equal protection analysis and finding mental retardation not a quasi-suspect
classification).
13. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 217.
14. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533–34 (1996) (finding the male-only admission
policy of a state-supported college in violation of the equal protection clause).
15. See Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440.
16. This Article makes no distinction between “suspect” classes, to which the Court affords its
strictest level of scrutiny, and “quasi-suspect” classes, to which the Court affords an intermediate
level of scrutiny. Courts have generally applied the same reasoning in determining whether a
classification merits strict or intermediate scrutiny. See Kerrigan, 957 A.2d at 430.
17. See id. at 426.
18. The Supreme Courts of California, Connecticut, and Iowa, respectively, have applied
heightened scrutiny to statutes distinguishing based on sexual orientation. See In re Marriage Cases,
43 Cal. 4th 757 (2008); Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 481 (Conn. 2008); Varnum
v. Brien, 763 N.W. 2d 862 (Iowa 2009).
19. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
20. 478 U.S. 186, 190-91 (1986) (rejecting a substantive due process claim with respect to a
sodomy statute on the basis that the Constitution confers no fundamental right to engage in
homosexual sodomy).
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that LGBTs are not a suspect class.21 In Ben-Shalom v. Marsh, 22 for example, the
court reasoned: “If homosexual conduct may constitutionally be criminalized,
then homosexuals do not constitute a suspect or quasi-suspect class entitled to
greater than rational basis scrutiny for equal protection purposes.”23
Courts have generally afforded heightened scrutiny to suspect classes
because these groups: (1) have faced social stigmatization and/or historical
discrimination;24 (2) bear an immutable characteristic beyond the control of the
individual;25 and (3) bear a characteristic that has no relation to a person’s ability
to contribute to society.26
Some courts have also considered whether groups are a minority or
whether they are politically powerless—lacking sufficient political power to
protect themselves against the passage of laws which deny them equal
protection.27 Courts have described these groups as “discrete and insular
minorities,” the discrimination against which “curtail[s] the operation of those
political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities.”28 Courts
consider these discrete and insular minorities to be “relegated to such a position
of political powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection from the
majoritarian political process.”29
Strong support exists for the argument that statutes distinguishing based
on sexual orientation merit heightened review because LGBTs meet the criteria
courts have consistently employed to determine whether a class is suspect.30
First, substantial authority supports the notion that LGBTs have been
subject to historical discrimination.31 For example, our country has criminalized
homosexual conduct in the past and dismissed persons from military service
based solely on their identification as LGBTs.32 Moreover, LGBTs have been
21. See High Tech Gays v. Def. Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 895 F.2d 563, 571 (9th Cir. 1990)
(holding that homosexuals are not a suspect class because the Constitution confers no fundamental
right to engage in sodomy per Bowers). See also Woodward v. United States, 871 F.2d 1068, 1076
(Fed. Cir. 1989) (relying on Bowers for the proposition that homosexuality is behavioral, not
immutable), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1003 (1990); Padula v. Webster, 822 F.2d 97, 103 (D.C. Cir. 1987)
(holding laws distinguishing based on sexual orientation not subject to heightened scrutiny because
Bowers upheld a state law criminalizing homosexual conduct).
22. 881 F.2d 454 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1004 (1990).
23. Id. at 464.
24. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684-85 (1973) (applying heightened scrutiny to a
federal statute requiring servicewomen, but not servicemen, to prove the dependency of their
spouses in order to access additional benefits).
25. Id. at 686.
26. Id.
27. Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 426 (Conn. 2008).
28. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938).
29. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 218 n.4 (1981) (quoting San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973)).
30. See Gay Rights Coal. of Georgetown Univ. Law Ctr. v. Georgetown Univ., 536 A.2d 1, 36
(D.C. Cir. 1987) (“[S]exual orientation appears to possess most or all of the characteristics that have
persuaded the Supreme Court to apply strict or heightened constitutional scrutiny to legislative
classifications under the Equal Protection Clause.”).
31. See Gay Rights Coal., 536 A.2d at 36; Kerrigan, 957 A.2d at 432-33; In re Marriage Cases, 43
Cal. 4th 757, 841 (2008).
32. See Varnum, 763 N.W. 2d at 889.
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victims of a significant number of hate crimes in this country.33 Even courts
concluding LGBTs are not a suspect class acknowledge that LGBTs have
suffered a history of discrimination.34
Second, significant case law supports the notion that sexual orientation
bears no relation to individuals’ ability to participate and contribute to society.35
This point is critical to courts’ analysis. If there is no real difference in the ability
of LGBTs compared to non-LGBTs, legislation treating LGBTs differently is
likely to be motivated by prejudice or an inaccurate stereotype.36 In this respect,
LGBTs are similar to racial minorities37 and women,38 but different from the
developmentally disabled, which the Supreme Court has concluded are not a
suspect class.39
Third, courts have begun to consider sexual orientation to be an immutable
characteristic on the basis that it is a defining trait of personhood “which may be
altered [if at all] only at the expense of significant damage to the individual’s
sense of self.”40
Finally, LGBTs are considered a minority group on the basis that they are
estimated to be between five and ten percent of the population.41
Despite the above analysis providing a strong basis for the Court to deem
LGBTs a suspect class, the Court has not yet done so. A finding by the Court
that LGBTs are politically powerless would provide yet an additional
justification for application of heightened scrutiny, and perhaps serve as the
tipping point in the Court’s analysis.
However, some courts have concluded LGBTs are without sufficient
political power.42 Others have diverged from this view.43 The Supreme Court

33. Statistics maintained by the Federal Bureau of Investigation indicate that in 2008 17.6% of
the victims of hate crimes were targeted based on their sexual orientation. Federal Bureau of
Investigation Unifrom Crime Reports, available at http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/hc2008/victims.
34. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 192 (1986) overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S.
558 (2003); Ben-Shalom v. Marsh, 881 F.2d 454, 465 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1004 (1990);
High Tech Gays, 895 F.2d at 573.
35. See Gay Rights Coal., 536 A.2d at 36; Equal. Found. v. City of Cincinnati, 860 F. Supp 417, 437
(S.D. Ohio 1994), rev’d on other grounds, 54 F.3d 261 (6th Cir. 1995), vacated, 518 U.S. 1001 (1996);
Kerrigan, 957 A.2d at 435; In re Marriage Cases, 43 Cal. 4th at 841.
36. See Varnum, 763 N.W. 2d at 890.
37. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 n.6 (“The Court has thus far reserved most
stringent judicial scrutiny for classifications based on race or national origin”); Grutter v. Bollinger,
539 U.S. 306, 326, 343 (2003) (applying strict scrutiny to a law school admissions policy that
considered race, among other factors, and holding the policy did not violate the equal protection
clause of the Constitution).
38. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973) (noting “the sex characteristic
frequently bears no relation to ability to perform or contribute to society”.)
39. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 442 (1985).
40. See Kerrigan, 957 A.2d at 438-39 (quoting Jantz v. Muci, 759 F. Supp 1543 (D. Kan. 1991)); see
also In re Marriage Cases, 43 Cal. 4th at 842 (quoting Egan v. Canada, 2 S.C.R. 513 (1995) for the
proposition that sexual orientation is “a deeply personal characteristic that is either unchangeable or
changeable only at unacceptable personal costs”); Gay Rights Coal., 536 A.2d 1 at 36; Jantz, 759 F.
Supp. at 1551 (finding sexual orientation a “central and defining aspect” of every person), rev’d on
other grounds, 976 F.2d 623 (10th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 952 (1993).
41. See Kerrigan, 957 A.2d at 440 n.30.
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has never specifically defined what it means for a group to be politically
powerless, nor has it articulated a particular measure of political power.44
IV. FINDING LGBTS A POLITICALLY POWERLESS MINORITY GROUP
A. Respect for LGBTs in the Legislative Process
In order to determine whether LGBTs are politically powerless, the Court
must ascertain whether they are respected in our nation’s legislatures—whether
their interests are fully taken into account in the majoritarian process.45 Justice
Marshall stated in his dissenting opinion in Cleburne that the political
powerlessness of a group is indicative of “a social and cultural isolation that
gives the majority little reason to respect or be concerned with that group’s
interests and needs.”46 Marshall illustrates this idea by pointing out that minors
technically lack political power in the sense that the law affords them neither the
right to vote nor the right to represent themselves in our nation’s legislatures.47
Yet the courts do not apply heightened scrutiny to laws treating minors
differently because legislators have an understanding of and respect for young
people. As Marshall states, legislators “were once themselves young, typically
have children of their own, and certainly interact regularly with minors.”48
Similarly, in Board of Retirement v. Murgia,49 the Court deemed the elderly not to
be a politically powerless minority group because “it marks a stage that each of
us will reach if we live out our normal span.”50 As Marshall reasons, a group
that most legislators can identify with or relate to is socially integrated, and thus
“treated in legislative arenas with full concern and respect.”51 A group that is
socially isolated does not receive the same concern and respect.
Applying Marshall’s analysis to LGBTs, there is no question LGBTs have
suffered social isolation.52 For example, in the past LGBTs have been deemed

42. See, e.g., Kerrigan, 957 A.2d at 461; Varnum, 763 N.W. 2d at 895; Gay Rights Coal., 536 A.2d at
37; Watkins v. U.S. Army, 847 F.2d 1329, 1348-49 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding homosexual orientation a
suspect classification and finding army regulations requiring dismissal of all homosexuals from the
army unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause), abrogated on other grounds, 875 F.2d 699,
704-05 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 957 (1990).
43. See, e.g., High Tech Gays v. Def. Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 895 F.2d 563, 574 (9th Cir.
1990) (finding homosexuals are not without political power); Ben-Shalom v. Marsh, 881 F.2d 454, 466
(7th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1004 (1990) (“In these times homosexuals are proving they are
not without growing political power.”), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1004 (1990); Steffan v. Cheney, 780 F.
Supp. 1, 7–8 (D.D.C. 1991) (“[H]omosexuals as a class enjoy a good deal of political power in our
society . . . .”), rev’d on other grounds sub nom., Steffan v. Aspin, 8 F.3d 57 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
44. See Varnum, 763 N.W. 2d at 893-4; Kerrigan, 957 A.2d at 441.
45. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 472 n.24 (1985); Kerrigan, 957 A.2d
at 429 n.22.
46. See Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 472 n.24 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. 427 U.S. 307 (1976).
50. Id. at 313–14.
51. Id.
52. Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 444-46, (Conn. 2008).

Powers_paginated.doc

7/2/2010 2:57:21 PM

FINDING LGBTS A SUSPECT CLASS

391

mentally ill, and many still believe homosexuality is “morally reprehensible.”53
Even further, intimate conduct between gay persons has been considered a
crime throughout our nation’s history.54
Unlike youth or old age, most non-LGBT legislators cannot identify with
being LGBT.55 Moreover, many non-LGBT legislators lack important contact
with the LGBT community that could help them relate to LGBTs. For example,
because the LGBT population is estimated to be only five to ten percent of the
population,56 most non-LGBT legislators likely do not have immediate family
members who are openly LGBT. This is even more likely to be the case for the
significant number of non-LGBT legislators across our nation representing rural
areas where the LGBT population is less concentrated.57
B. Respect for LGBTs Measured by Direct Representation in Our Nation’s LawMaking Institutions
Respect for LGBTs in our nation’s legislative bodies can be measured by the
number of openly LGBT representatives serving in those bodies.58 In the past,
the Court has considered the direct representation of minorities in our
government in determining whether a group is politically powerless.
For example, the low number of women serving in our nation’s decisionmaking councils was a central factor the Court relied on in concluding that
statutes distinguishing based on sex are subject to heightened review.59 In
Frontiero v. Richardson, the Court acknowledged that while women technically
are not minorities, women are politically powerless because they face
discrimination in the “political arena.”60
The Court cited “vast”
underrepresentation of women in the political process, noting that, at that time
in 1973, no women served in the United States Senate, only fourteen women
served in the House of Representatives, and no women had ever served on the
U.S. Supreme Court or as President of the United States.61

53. Id. at 444-45.
54. See id. at 444.
55. See Watkins v. U.S. Army, 847 F.2d 1329, 1348 (9th Cir. 1988) (“[M]any elected officials are
likely to have difficulty understanding or emphasizing with homosexuals.”), abrogated on other
grounds, 875 F.2d 699, 704-05 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 957 (1990).
56. See Kerrigan, 957 A.2d at 440 n.30.
57. Ninety percent of the nation’s LGBT population lives in metropolitan areas. Joshua Lynsen,
More Americans Coming Out In Rural Areas, N.Y. BLADE, Feb. 2, 2007, available at http://
www.law.ucla.edu/williamsinstitute/press/MoreAmericansComingOutInRuralAreas.html.
58. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 n.17 (1973) (citing discrimination against
women in the “political arena” in concluding women are a suspect class); Equal. Found. v. City of
Cincinnati, 860 F. Supp 417, 439 (S.D. Ohio 1994), rev’d on other grounds, 54 F.3d 261 (6th Cir. 1995),
vacated, 518 U.S. 1001 (1996) (finding the LGBT community a politically powerless minority on the
basis that “[O]penly gay, lesbian and bisexual individuals are almost entirely absent from the
‘Nation’s decisionmaking councils’ as were women at the time of the Frontiero decision.”); Kerrigan,
957 A.2d at 446 (“Insofar as gay persons play a role in the political process, it is apparent that their
numbers reflect their status as a small and insular minority.”)
59. See Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 686 n.17.
60. Id.
61. Id.
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A similar analysis of the extent to which openly LGBT persons are
represented in our nation’s legislatures should instruct the Court’s
determination of whether LGBTs are politically powerless—whether they are
respected in the legislative process. There is no question openly LGBT
legislators have a direct understanding of the experience and needs of LGBTs.
Moreover, the greater the number of openly LGBT representatives serving in a
legislative body, the more opportunity for non-LGBT legislators to interact with
LGBTs and gain a better understanding of the LGBT experience and perspective.
Direct representation of LGBTs impacts the ability of our nation’s legislative
bodies to respond to the needs of this minority community.
1. LGBT Legislators More Likely to Champion the LGBT Community
The presence of openly LGBT legislators creates respect for LGBTs within
that legislative body. By virtue of being LGBT, openly LGBT legislators are
incentivized to champion legislation specifically designed to benefit and protect
LGBTs. For example, two of the three openly LGBT members in the 111th
Congress have sponsored legislation specifically designed to address the needs
of LGBTs.
Representative Barney Frank of Massachusetts introduced the Employment
Non-Discrimination Act,62 which proposes to extend federal employment
discrimination protections to include discrimination based on sexual orientation
and gender identity. Similarly, Representative Tammy Baldwin of Wisconsin
has introduced both the Domestic Partnership Benefits and Obligations Act,63 which
would require the federal government to provide the same benefits to its LGBT
civilian employees as those already provided to its employees with different-sex
spouses and the Ending Health Disparities for LGBT Americans Act,64 designed to
make the nation’s health care system more equitable for LGBTs.
Moreover, research suggests that as the number of LGBTs serving in state
legislatures increases, so does the number of bills introduced in and adopted by
those institutions that are helpful to LGBTs.65
2. LGBT Legislators More Likely to Identify the Impact of Facially Neutral
Legislation on LGBTs
Openly LGBT legislators are more likely to identify the impact on LGBTs of
legislation which, on its face, does not specifically address LGBTs. This is
important because non-LGBT legislators—particularly those with little or no
contact with the LGBT community—are less cognizant of and sensitive to the
needs and concerns of LGBTs.66 For example, the health care debate during the
62. See S.1584, 111th Cong. (2009), H.R. 3017, 111th Cong. (2009).
63. See S.1102, 111th Cong. (2009), H.R. 2517, 111th Cong. (2009).
64. See H.R. 3001, 111th Cong. (2009).
65. See Donald P. Haider-Markel, Representation and Backlash: The Positive and Negative Influence
of Descriptive Representation, 32 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 107, 117 (2007).
66. See Jantz v. Muci, 759 F. Supp. 1543, 1550 (D. Kan. 1991) (finding that homosexuals have
limited political power and stating, “By diminishing contact between the heterosexual majority and
avowed homosexuals, the majority loses any perspective on concerns in the homosexual community
and is deprived of the resulting sensitivity to those concerns.”), rev’d on other grounds, 976 F.2d 623
(10th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 952 (1993).
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111th Congress did not specifically address the rights of LGBTs because the goal
was to reform the system and expand insurance coverage for all Americans. Yet
Tammy Baldwin led an effort in the House to amend its health care reform
legislation to: (1) assist people with AIDS in accessing drugs under Medicare;
and (2) include data collection on the health of LGBTs.67
3. LGBT Legislators More Dependent on other LGBT Legislators to Pass
Legislation Addressing the LGBT Community
Openly LGBT legislators rely upon other LGBT legislators to build the
support necessary to pass legislation designed to benefit and protect LGBTs.
Most legislation pending in the House of Representatives during the 111th
Congress addressing the needs of LGBTs and sponsored by an openly LGBT
member of Congress is co-sponsored by another openly LGBT member of
Congress.
Openly LGBT legislators are less likely to be able to depend on help from
non-LGBT legislators who may fear backlash from their constituents for
supporting the LGBT community.68
Non-LGBT legislators championing
protection for LGBTs are at risk of becoming real or perceived targets of
prejudice,69 particularly in the parts of the country that have taken proactive
steps to limit LGBT rights in recent years.70 The presence of openly LGBT
legislators who can serve as needed allies and educate non-LGBT legislators as
to the needs of the community creates respect in the legislature for LGBTs.
In sum, direct representation of LGBTs in our nation’s legislatures is
paramount to ensuring LGBTs are respected by this branch of government.
Such legislators are more likely to champion issues relevant to the LGBT
community, identify the impact of facially neutral legislation on LGBTs, serve as
allies for each other in efforts to pass legislation addressing the LGBT
community, and educate their colleagues as to the LGBT experience.

67. See H.R. 3962, 111th Cong. (2009).
68. See Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 452 (Conn. 2008) (noting that
“potential allies from outside the gay [and lesbian] community may think twice about allying their
fortunes with such a despised population.”) (brackets in original).
69. See, e.g., Jantz, 759 F. Supp. at 1550 (“Politicians seeking to limit the impact of antihomosexual prejudices through legislation are themselves the target of prejudice.”); Watkins v. U.S.
Army, 847 F.2d 1329, 1348 (9th Cir. 1988) (“Elected officials sensitive to public prejudice may refuse
to support legislation that even appears to condone homosexuality.”), abrogated on other grounds, 875
F.2d 699, 704–05 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 957 (1990).
70. Since 2004, 26 states have passed constitutional bans on same-sex marriage: Alabama,
Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana,
Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Carolina,
South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia and Wisconsin. Same-sex marriage has been
defeated by the voters in every state—31 in total—in which it has been put on the ballot. See Glenn
Adams and David Crary, Maine Voters Reject Gay-Marriage Law, WASH. TIMES, Nov. 4, 2009.
Moreover, Congress enacted the Defense of Marriage Act in 1996 which states that no state is
required to honor a same-sex marriage under the laws of another state, 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2006), and
explicitly defines marriage as a union between a man and woman only. 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2006). In
addition, Arkansas passed a ballot initiative in 2008 forbidding adoption by unmarried adults. See
Unmarried Couple Adoption Ban, Ark. Ballot Initiative 1 (2008).
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C. LGBTs Must Be Proportionately Represented in Our Nation’s Legislatures
To Ensure These Institutions Respect LGBTs
1. Standard of Measurement
At a minimum, LGBTs must be represented in our nation’s legislatures at a
level proportional to the LGBT population at large, which is estimated to be
between five and ten percent.71 This will give Americans reasonable confidence
that LGBTs’ interests will be respected in the law-making process, and that the
legislatures will not pass statutes that discriminate against LGBTs in violation of
the equal protection clause.
It is insufficient to argue that LGBTs are politically powerful because there
is one openly LGBT member of Congress,72 or alleged closeted legislators.
Closeted representatives cannot create the respect for the LGBT community in
the legislatures as described above in Section IV.A. They may even oppose
legislation addressing LGBTs to stymie suspicion about their sexual
orientation.73
Given the history of discrimination against LGBTs, trivial representation of
LGBTs is also not enough to create respect for the LGBT community. The court
in Steffan v. Cheney,74 which held sexual orientation is not a suspect classification,
found LGBTs “enjoy a good deal of political power,” and stated, “just because
there are only a few members of Congress who are openly homosexual does not
mean that homosexuals as a class are without influence.” The court reasoned:
“[t]here are not many medical doctors in Congress either, and yet that
profession is exceptionally well represented on Capitol Hill.”75 But this type of
reasoning signals a lack of appreciation for the life experience of LGBTs.
Medical doctors have always been among the most respected of professionals in
our nation and have not suffered from the type of discrimination, isolation, and
hatred that the LGBT community has endured throughout our nation’s history.76
2. Application of Standard
Although society may be becoming more accepting of LGBTs,
representation of LGBTs in our nation’s legislatures remains dismal at best. The
Supreme Court of Connecticut recently concluded that LGBTs are a political
underclass based on the diminutive number of LGBTs serving in our nation’s
political and judicial institutions.77
The current number of LGBTs serving in our law-making institutions is far
short of proportional representation. Only .69%, or three, members of Congress
71. See supra note 41.
72. See Ben-Shalom v. Marsh, 881 F.2d 454, 466 n.9 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1004
(1990).
73. See Watkins, 847 F.2d at 1348 (“[T]he social, economic, and political pressures to conceal
one’s homosexuality commonly deter many gays from openly advocating pro homosexual
legislation . . . .”).
74. 780 F. Supp. 1, 7–8 (D.D.C. 1991), rev’d on other grounds sub nom., Steffan v. Aspin, 8 F.3d 57
(D.C. Cir. 1993).
75. Id. at 9.
76. See supra Section IV.A.
77. Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 447 (Conn. 2008).
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are openly LGBT. Only .01%, or seventy-four, of our states’ legislative
representatives are openly LGBT. Moreover, only one statewide elected official
is openly LGBT. No openly LGBT person has ever served in the U.S. Senate, on
the Supreme Court, or as President of the United States. Overall, .089% or 445 of
the 500,000 elected officials in America are openly LGBT.78
These facts confirm LGBTs are severely underrepresented in our nation’s
law-making institutions, making it difficult for them to command respect for
their interests as described above in Section IV.B. The Court should consider
LGBTs a politically powerless minority group on this basis and apply
heightened scrutiny to legislation passed by these institutions which treat
LGBTs differently.
V. MEASURING THE POLITICAL POWER OF LGBTS BASED ON ISOLATED LEGISLATIVE
VICTORIES IS NOT ACCURATE AND TOO NARROW
Many courts have concluded LGBTs are politically powerful based on a
record of legislation protecting LGBTs.79 One court even relied on legislative
debate hostile to LGBTs to conclude they are successful in capturing Congress’
attention.80 Indeed, litigants arguing LGBTs are not a suspect class have cited
legislative victories as conclusive evidence they are politically powerful and not
a suspect class.81 This conclusion is inaccurate and based on evidence that is too
narrow.
First, it is inaccurate because the legislative protections and rights that have
been afforded to LGBTs are much less than the protections afforded women
when the Court deemed them a suspect class per Frontiero in 1973. For example,
in Frontiero the Court noted that Congress had afforded women protection
against discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, protection
against disparate pay under the Equal Pay Act of 1963, and passed the Equal
Rights Amendment.82 Yet today many fundamental protections afforded to
women and racial minorities are still not available to LGBTs, such as protection
against employment discrimination, the right to openly serve in the military,
and the ability to sponsor a same-sex partner for family-based immigration.
Other rights, such as marriage, domestic partnership, family and medical leave
for unmarried same-sex partners, and the right to adopt children are available to
LGBTs in some states but not others. Furthermore, in recent years our
government has adopted laws that are openly hostile to LGBTs. The federal

78. An inventory of current openly LGBT elected representatives is maintained by the Gay &
Lesbian Leadership Institute, at http://www.glli.org/out_officials (last visited September 4, 2009).
79. See High Tech Gays v. Def. Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 895 F.2d 563, 574 (9th Cir. 1990);
Steffan, 780 F. Supp. at 9.
80. See Dahl v. Sec’y of the U. S. Navy, 830 F. Supp. 1319, 1324 (E.D. Cal. 1993) (finding
homosexuals without political power, noting, “[R]ecent Congressional and executive dialogue
concerning homosexuals’ ability to serve in the military demonstrates that, despite their apparent
inability to assert direct control over Congress, homosexuals have a significant ability to attract
Congress’ attention.”).
81. See In re Marriage Cases, 43 Cal. 4th 757, 843 (2008).
82. See, e.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 687 (1973); Kerrigan, 957 A.2d at 452 (finding
that gay persons in Connecticut hold less political power than women did when Frontiero was
decided in 1973, based in part on legislation enacted to protect women).
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government, for example, passed Don’t Ask Don’t Tell83 and the Defense of
Marriage Act.84 Moreover, many states have passed laws and/or constitutional
amendments prohibiting LGBTs from adopting children85 or banning same-sex
marriage.86 This is of no surprise given the severely low number of openly
LGBT legislators serving in our nation’s legislatures.
Second, concluding LGBTs are politically powerful based on isolated
legislative victories is too narrow a measure of whether LGBTS are respected in
the legislative process. For example, it does not measure the extent to which
legislation addressing LGBT needs has been introduced but never enacted or
ushered to the top of the legislative agenda by party leadership.87 Moreover, as
discussed above in Section IV.B.2., focusing on legislation specifically regarding
LGBTs does not measure whether their interests have been considered and
respected regarding legislative issues facially neutral to LGBTs such as health
care reform.
Finally, analyzing isolated legislative victories fails to take into account the
willingness of legislators to assist LGBTs in other ways. For example, it does not
measure the extent to which legislators earmark funding within the
83. See 10 U.S.C. § 654 (2006) (prohibiting openly LGBT persons, or persons found to have
engaged in homosexual acts or to have married or attempted to marry a person of the same-sex,
from serving in the military).
84. See 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2006) (stating that no state shall be required to recognize a same-sex
relationship recognized as a marriage under the laws of another state); 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2006) (defining
marriage as a union between a man and woman).
85. Five states—Arkansas, Florida, Michigan, Mississippi and Utah—prohibit same-sex couples
from jointly petitioning for adoption. See Unmarried Couple Adoption Ban, Ark. Ballot Initiative 1
(West Supp. 2008) (prohibiting a person co-habitating with a sexual partner outside of marriage from
becoming a foster or adoptive parent); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 710.24 (permitting adoption by a a
“person, together with his wife or her husband, if married.” The state attorney general issued an
opinion stating that same-sex couples married in other states may not adopt, but one member of that
couple may adopt in Michigan as a single person. Op. Att’y Gen. 7160 (Mich. 2004)); MISS. CODE
ANN. § 93-17-3(5) (Supp. 2009) (“Adoption by couples of the same gender is prohibited.”); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 78B-6-117(3) (prohibiting adoption by a “a person who is cohabiting in a relationship
that is not a legally valid and binding marriage under the laws of this state”) (2008). In addition,
Florida prohibits any “homosexual” person from adopting. See FLA. STAT. ANN. Section 63.042(3)
(West) (“No person eligible to adopt under this statute may adopt if that person is a homosexual.”)
86. See supra note 70.
87. The following bills addressing the needs of the LGBT community have been introduced in
Congress, but have not been enacted as of May 9, 2010: (1) the Employment Non-Discrimination Act,
S.1584, 111th Cong. (2009), H.R. 3017, 111th Cong. (2009), would provide protections against
employment discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation; (2) the Domestic Partnership Benefits
and Obligations Act, S. 1102, 111th Cong. (2009), H.R. 2517, 111th Cong. (2009), would provide the
benefits afforded to different sex spouses to LGBT federal civilian employees; ; (3) the Tax Equity for
Domestic Partner and Health Plan Beneficiaries Act, S. 1153, 111th Cong. (2009), H.R. 2625, 111th
Cong. (2009), would prohibit the taxation of benefits provided for domestic partners under
employers’ health plans; (4) the Early Treatment for HIV Act, S. 833, 111th Cong. (2009), H.R. 1616,
111th Cong. (2009), would provide states the option of covering low-income HIV-positive people
under Medicaid, before they become disabled, and provide an increased federal match for this
purpose; (5) the Uniting American Families Act S. 424, 111th Cong. (2009), H.R. 1024, 111th Cong.
(2009), would permit Americans to sponsor their same-sex partner for family-based immigration; (6)
the Military Readiness Enhancement Act, H.R. 1283, 111th Cong. (2009), would repeal Don’t Ask,
Don’t Tell, the policy prohibiting LGBTs from openly serving in the military; and (7) the Ending
Health Disparities for LGBT Americans Act, H.R. 3001, 111th Cong. (2009), would make the nation’s
health care system more equiptable for LGBTs.
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appropriations bill for LGBT-related causes, or help LGBT constituent groups
access government services.
VI. ASSESSING THE POLITICAL POWER OF LGBTS IS A CRITICAL CONSIDERATION
UNDER EQUAL PROTECTION ANALYSIS DESPITE REAL OR PERCEIVED ELECTORAL
GAINS OF OTHER GROUPS AFFORDED SUSPECT STATUS
Some may argue the political power of a minority group is now a moot
factor under equal protection analysis. As the argument goes, courts continue to
apply heightened scrutiny to statutes distinguishing based on race or sex despite
real or perceived electoral gains by women and racial minorities.88
However, this argument ignores important distinctions between the
treatment of LGBTs as compared to women and racial minority groups in this
country. Our country affords women and racial minorities legal protection
against discrimination, yet the states and the federal government have passed
numerous laws which explicitly deny equal treatment for LGBTs.89 This is why
assessing the political power of LGBTs to protect themselves against passage of
such laws by our legislative institutions is not only relevant but critical to the
Court’s equal protection analysis when reviewing laws treating LGBTs
differently.
VII. ADDRESSING THE COUNTER MAJORITARIAN DIFFICULTY
Others question whether the Court’s application of heightened scrutiny is
appropriate given the democratic principles upon which our government was
founded. Judicial review of statutes passed by the legislature, a co-equal branch
of government, raises the counter majoritarian difficulty—the concern that it is
undemocratic for the courts to thwart the will of the legislature when, according
to the courts, the actions of the legislature stand in violation of the Constitution.
Over time, our country has become more willing to recognize judicial
review as a tool necessary to uphold our constitutional values. According to
Justice Marshall in Cleburne, this is because “[s]hifting cultural, political and
social patterns at times come to make past practices appear inconsistent with
fundamental principles upon which American society rests, an inconsistency
legally cognizable under the Equal Protection Clause.”90 For example, most
Americans are likely to agree that it was appropriate for the Court to review and
strike the following: (1) a Virginia law making it a felony for a white person to
marry a colored person;91 and (2) a federal law requiring a servicewoman to
prove her spouse’s dependency in order to access enhanced benefits, but not
imposing the same requirement on servicemen.92 This is because our country’s
views regarding the abilities, rights, and roles of racial minorities and women

88. See In re Marriage Cases 43 Cal. 4th 757, 842-43 (2008).
89. See discussion of rights and protections afforded to women and racial minorities, but not
LGBTS supra Section V.
90. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 466 (1985) (concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
91. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
92. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
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have progressed over time, perhaps in part because of the Court’s action in
those cases.
The debate regarding the counter majoritarian difficulty could be renewed
if the Court were to afford heightened scrutiny to another suspect class like
LGBTs. Our society has not reached a consensus regarding the rights of LGBTs
(unlike racial minorities or women) or the appropriateness of statutes which
treat LGBTs differently. In recent years the federal government and many states
have passed laws limiting the rights of LGBTs,93 while a few states have passed
laws extending rights to LGBTs.94
The Court could address the counter majoritarian difficulty by deeming
LGBTs a suspect class under the reasoning I set forth in this Article. Our
nation’s legislative institutions are flawed with respect to LGBTs because they
do not respect the concerns of this community and heightened review should be
afforded to remedy the problem. Heightened judicial review is appropriate and
required in this case precisely because a co-equal branch of government is
unable to ensure equal protection of the laws for LGBTs and adherence to the
Constitution.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Because LGBTs are grossly underrepresented in our nation’s legislative
bodies, the ability of these institutions to respect the concerns of LGBTs and
ensure equal protection of the laws is compromised. Americans have reason to
doubt the constitutionality of statutes passed by these institutions that treat
LGBTs differently. It is imperative that the Court apply heightened scrutiny to
such statutes. Our Constitution demands nothing less.

93. See supra notes 70 and 83-85.
94. New Hampshire recognizes same-sex marriage as of January 1, 2010. See N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 457:1-a (LexisNexis Supp. 2009). Vermont recognizes same-sex marriage as of September 1,
2009. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15 § 8 (Supp. 2009).

